I. INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, there has been a steady increase in the number of proposals for chaotic cryptosystems. Early proposals included the use of synchronized dynamical systems. In synchronization-based systems, a common coupling signal provides synchronized states. These states are, in turn, used to encrypt and decrypt messages [1] . Synchronization based cryptosystems can generate ciphertext with desirable statistical properties. However, these systems are weak against adaptive synchronization and identification attacks [2] , [3] , [4] .
More recently, a number of chaotic image encryption systems have been proposed. Some of them use discretized chaotic systems in order to obtain algebraic transformations which operate directly on the plaintext image pixels [5] , [6] . Others quantize discrete-time chaotic signals to obtain running key sequences [7] , [8] Although these approaches provide a framework similar to the general practice in classical cryptography, we still need to rigorously analyze each proposal in order to establish trust in its secure operation. For example, even if the statistical properties of a cryptosystem are at a desirable level, the algebraic structure of the system might contain flaws and weaknesses that can be exploited to compromise its security. Hence, a healthy co-development of chaos cryptography and chaos cryptanalysis provides the necessary framework for designing more secure chaotic cryptosystems.
In this paper, we give a complete break of the image encryption algorithm proposed in [7] . We apply chosen-plaintext and known-plaintext attacks and show that the algorithm can be completely broken using only a couple of known or chosen images. The method we employ is similar in spirit to the one proposed in [9] . However, in our approach, we use the particular structure of the permutation to yield an exact break.
The organization of the paper as follows. In the next section we give the description of the algorithm proposed in [7] . In Section 3, we give the chosen-plaintext attack. In section 4, we give known-plaintext attack. Section 5 illustrates the attacks with simulations. We finish with concluding remarks.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE ENCRYPTION SCHEME
The plaintext is an image of size h × w, where each pixel is represented as a byte. The encryption involves three operations; mixing, row rotation and column rotation.
The scheme uses three chaotic systems to generate the pseudo-random variables used in the three steps. The key of the overall system is two real parameters x 0 , y 0 ∈ (−1, 1).
The first chaotic system is a 2D discrete-time system given as
where f 0 (u) = 8u 4 − 8u 2 + 1 and f 1 (u) = 4u 3 − 3u. At each step, one of the state variables x n , y n is chosen as
Finally, we obtain from z n an integer k n in the set {0, 1, . . . , 255} as k n = 128(z n + 1) .
The chaotic system (1) is iterated hw times and the sequence {k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k hw } is reshaped into an image using row scan. Let K denote this noise-like image. The second chaotic system is given by
An integer sequence ρ n in {0, 1, . . . , w − 1} is obtained using
The chaotic system (2) is iterated h times so, we obtain the sequence
The third chaotic system is given by
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The chaotic system (4) is iterated w times so, we obtain the sequence {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · σ w }. The generated parameters K, ρ and σ are used in the encryption as follows.
Let P denote the plaintext image. In the mixing step, the plaintext is XORed with K to obtain the intermediate value
In the row rotation step, each row of M are circularly rotated right with rotation amounts given in the sequence ρ. The row rotation step can be written as
where N denotes the second intermediate variable. Finally, the columns of N are circularly rotated down with rotation amounts taken from the sequence σ. The column rotation can be written as
The image C is the ciphertext. The decryption is straightforward. Using the secret parameters, x 0 , y 0 , we use (1), (2) and (4) to produce K, ρ and σ. We go from C to M using (8) then (7) . We recover P with P = M ⊕ K. Figure 1 shows the block diagram representation of the encryption algorithm.
III. CHOSEN PLAINTEXT ATTACK
A naive attack on the cryptosystem might try to reveal the secret keys x 0 and y 0 . However, we note that the parameters K, ρ and σ uniquely specify the encryption and the decryption operations. Hence if an attacker manages to reveal these parameters, he can decrypt ciphertext images as if he is the legal recipient. He does not need to know the original keys x 0 and y 0 . In this and the next section, we give attacks that try to recover K, ρ and σ.
Assume that the attacker knows a plaintext-ciphertext image pair (P 1 , C 1 ). He choses a plaintext image P 2 such that
Namely, P 2 differs from P 1 only in the first row, and the difference in every pixel is just 1. The attacker observes the ciphertext C 2 .
Using (6), we have
Hence, ∆M 12 is an image with zeros everywhere except on the first row, where we have 1s. Using this with (7), we have
Namely, ∆M 12 remains the same under row rotation. When we apply the column rotation to ∆N 12 , the row of 1s is distributed according to σ in
Thus, if the attacker observes that ∆C 12 (i, j) = 1, then he concludes that σ j = i − 1. Since each column of ∆C 12 has only one nonzero pixel, the attacker can thus determine σ j , 1 ≤ j ≤ w. Now that the attacker knows σ, he chooses another plaintext P 3 and obtains the ciphertext C 3 . This time, P 3 differs from P 1 only in the first column. Difference is again just 1 in every pixel. Since the attacker knows ∆C 13 = C 1 ⊕ C 3 , he uses (8) to obtain the value of ∆N 13 = N 1 ⊕ N 3 . He also knows ∆M 13 = P 1 ⊕ P 3 . Note that, by the particular choice of P 3 , the first column of ∆M 13 is 1s and it is zero everwhere else. Comparing ∆M 13 with ∆N 13 and using (7) we have
Thus, if the attacker sees that ∆N 13 (i, j) = 1, he concludes that ρ i = j − 1.
Once the attacker has revealed the rotation amounts ρ and σ, finding K is straightforward. He starts with C 1 and uses (8) then (7) to obtain M 1 . Then, he reveals K using K = P 1 ⊕M 1 .
The chosen-plaintext attack requires one known and two chosen plaintext images. The attack requires very little amount of computation.
IV. KNOWN PLAINTEXT ATTACK
In some cases, it might be difficult for the attacker to choose a plaintext and apply chosen-plaintext attack. In this section we describe a known-plaintext attack that requires about two known plaintext-ciphertext pairs of images.
Assume the plaintext-ciphertext pairs (P 1 , C 1 ) and (P 2 , C 2 ) are known by the attacker. We know that ∆M = M 1 ⊕ M 2 = ∆P = P 1 ⊕P 2 . So the attcker knows ∆M. Also, he calculates ∆C = C 1 ⊕ C 2 .
Going from ∆M to ∆C we have first the rows and then the columns rotated. There are no modifications to the pixel values of ∆M. Assume that the attacker observes
So, the pixel (i 1 , j 1 ) of ∆M is moved to one of the locations (s 1 , t 1 ), (s 2 , t 2 ), . . . , (s m , t m ) in ∆C. Using (7) and (8), we have
Repeating the observation for another pixel ∆M (i 1 , j 2 ) on the same row, the attacker sees that ∆M (i 1 , j 2 ) is moved to one of the locations (s 1 ,t 1 ), (s 2 ,t 2 ), . . . , (sm,tm) in ∆C. Thus, ρ i1 ∈ A 2 = {t 1 −j 2 mod w,t 2 −j 2 mod w, . . . ,tm−j 2 mod w}.
Hence, the attacker knows that ρ i1 ∈ A 1 ∩ A 2 . Considering all the pixels on the same row, we obtain
If the intersection is a single point then the attacker has found ρ i . If not, he uses another plaintext-ciphertext pair. The attacker repeats the whole procedure for all the rows and reveals ρ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ h.
Note that the intersection might shrink to a single point even with the first few A j 's.
Once the attacker has the sequence ρ, he uses a similar set intersection method to reveal σ. First, using (7) and ∆M , the attacker finds ∆N. Going from ∆N to ∆C, only the columns are rotated. Now, he compares the pixel value of ∆N (i, j) to the pixel values on the j th column of ∆C. Assume that he observes,
Then, he knows that
(10) Repeating the observation for all pixels on the j th column, the attacker obtains
Again, the attacker repeats the set intersection, with additional known plaintexts if necessary, until the intersection is a single point. Then, he knows the value of σ j . He repeats the whole procedure for all the columns.
Once the attacker has ρ and σ, he uses (8) then (7) on a ciphertext image C 1 to obtain M 1 . He then recovers the key as K = M 1 ⊕ P 1 .
The attack requires only a few known plaintext-ciphertext pairs for moderate image sizes.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS

A. Chosen plaintext attack
In order to better illustrate the steps of the attack, we work with 16 × 16 images. We choose the secret keys as x 0 = 0.41 and y 0 = 0.87. Using (2), (3), (4) and (5), we obtain the rotation sequences ρ and σ as ρ = {5, 13, 0, 13, 6, 4, 3, 9, 2, 15, 10, 14, 9, 15, 7, 1}, σ = {8, 7, 9, 3, 15, 11, 0, 1, 11, 0, 0, 5, 14, 7, 8, 6} .
The key image K is shown in Figure 2a .
Assume that the attacker knows that the known plaintext P 1 is the two-level checkerboard image shown in Figure 2b . He chooses the plaintext P 2 by flippping the values on the first row of P 1 . P 2 and ∆P 12 = P 1 ⊕ P 2 are shown in Figure 2d and 2c. Note that ∆P 12 is all zeros except in the first row where it is all ones.
In Figure 2a , the pixel values span the full grayscale range 0 − 255. In Figures 2b, 2c and 2d, we used scaling so that a white square represents a pixel value of 1 rather than 255.
The ciphertext C 1 and the difference ∆C 12 = C 1 ⊕ C 2 are shown in Figure 3 . Obviously, σ appears as the distances of the nonzero pixels from the first row in ∆C 12 .
Next, the attacker chooses the plaintext P 3 shown in Figure  4a . Note that P 3 is obtained by flipping the pixels of P 1 on the first column. Now that the attacker knows σ, he applies (8) to ∆C 13 and obtains ∆N 13 = N 1 ⊕ N 3 . The difference ∆N 13 is shown in Figure 4b . This time, ρ appears as the distances of nonzero pixels from the first column in ∆N 13 .
Finally, the attacker uses (8) and (7) to get M 1 from C 1 .
B. Known plaintext attack
Assume that the attacker knows the two plaintext-cipher text pairs shown in Figures 5a and 5b . The image sizes are 256 × 256. Assume the secret parameters x 0 , y 0 are as before. The difference of images, ∆P = ∆M = P 1 ⊕ P 2 , is shown in Figure 5c .
Starting with the pixel ∆M (1, 1), we see that 38 j=1 A j contains just one element. So, we do not need to further intersect the sets A j , 38 < j ≤ 256, to find ρ 1 . In general, we need far fewer number of sets than the number of columns. Figure 6 shows the number of sets we intersected to pin down ρ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 256. We see that we need to intersect at most 40 sets.
Once the attacker knows ρ, he uses (7) to calculate ∆N from ∆M. ∆N is shown in Figure 5d . Note that ∆N does not look like a random image because it is only the row-rotated version of ∆M = ∆P. Using (10) and (11), the attacker determines σ j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 256. Since the images contain enough variation in their pixel values, only a few B i sets need to be intersected. Figure 7 shows the number of sets we intersected to pin down σ j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 256. We see that at most 2 sets need to be intersected for every σ j . Once the attacker has ρ and σ, he uses (8) and (7) to get M 1 from C 1 . He calculates K as K = M 1 ⊕ P 1 .
The attack takes less than a minute on MATLAB running on Mac OS X 10.5.4 with Intel Core 2 Duo 2.16 GHz processor and 2 GB RAM.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we gave a complete break of a recently proposed image encryption algorithm. We have demonstrated that the secret parameters can easily be found using chosenplaintext and known-plaintext attacks. Using simulation examples on real images, we have shown that our proposed attacks require very little amount of computation. The author thanks an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the similar work in [9] 
